U.S. District Court Judge J. Garvan Murtha explained that he couldn’t be more lenient to Michael Manovill and Aaron Ruby because of the mandatory minimum sentence and gave each man five years in prison for the use of a gun in a drug crime.  Somehow Judge Murtha was able to disconnect robbery participants Michael and Peter Charron from the mandatory minimum, with Michael receiving a year and a day and Peter two years probation.  Meanwhile, Michael Connarn of Northfield is finishing up a 24-year sentence for three relatively minor drug crimes with no guns or violence involved. 

So what message did the defendants get?  Since his release from prison Michael Charron has repeatedly violated the conditions of his supervised release including missing 11 appointments for urine tests and testing positive for marijuana and cocaine.  Judge Murtha could have sentenced Charron to 9 months imprisonment, but instead chose 5.  The message seems to be that violent criminals receive better treatment than non-violent ones. 

As a reaction, the legislature passed new laws lowering the amount of drugs to qualify for trafficking, the Governor touted the potential 30-year sentences, and U.S. Sen. Leahy convened a meeting of the Senate Judiciary Committee in Rutland.  As to Shelton and Ramos, Shelton was treated for his wound at the Rutland Hospital and skipped town.  Rutland County State’s Attorney James Mongeon couldn’t figure out what to charge Ramos with, so he was released after serving a couple of months for marijuana possession.  He’s now left the state.  The plan seems to be to hope that the feds will pick up the case and find the missing defendants, but Vermont’s U.S. Attorney Tom Anderson is making no promises.  With this kind of prosecutorial incompetence, Gov. Douglas is going to have to wait a long time to see those 30-year sentences.  “Stay tuned,” says Rutland Det. Raymond LaMoria.  Yeah, right. 

Conventional wisdom had it that federal prosecutions were used in cases where the evidence was weak, in that a criminal defendant has far fewer rights in federal than in most state courts, or in cases where the longer federal sentences could be used to either make an example or coerce “cooperation”.  However, the distinctions are blurring.  Gov. Douglas was crowing about Vermont’s recently-enacted drug law providing for 30-year sentences for drug trafficking; and the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that even though an arrest is illegal under state law, a search pursuant to that arrest is legal, and the fruits of the search can be used in a criminal prosecution. 

There’s no reason for alarm.  The responsibility for the failure in the Brillon case lies squarely at the feet of the trial court, but in the most recent cases the judges are on top of the situation.  If assigned counsel is not prepared, or otherwise not performing to a minimum standard, the court has a duty to replace him or her.  There’s a reason lawyers are held in lower esteem than used car salesmen, and it’s not because they perform admirably in every case.  If counsel’s performance is found to be adequate, the defendant can either keep the assigned attorney or go it alone.  It’s just that simple.

Dooley suggests remanding the case to determine if the police first spotted the plants at the 500-foot altitude permitted by law and regulation, rather than the 50 to 100 feet where the chopper spent most of its time.  This is more than a little disingenuous in that the cops had already claimed that they never went below 500 feet, a claim the trial court found “not credible” in light of extensive witness testimony to the contrary.  It’s going to take yet another violation of someone’s privacy to get this sorted out.

 The obvious purpose of the right is to prevent the state from locking up its citizens for an extended period of time (whether from neglect or malice) while simultaneously denying any forum to prove their innocence.  The court cannot micromanage the affairs of the legislative and executive branches, and the only tool available to correct a gross abuse of due process is to vacate the conviction.  As the court majority succinctly put it: “defendant’s trial was delayed for several months, even years, because of the failure of several assigned counsel to do anything to move his case forward.” 

The dissent, written by Justice Burgess (Reiber, CJ concurring), advocates the proposition that the delays were defendant’s fault for “monkey wrenching” the system by not agreeing to go to trial with counsel that was admittedly unprepared.  However, the real reason for the dissent is clear enough from the opening sentence:  “Today the majority frees a convicted woman beater and habitual offender,…”  While the defendant’s character could have nothing to do with a speedy trial issue, apparently it figured into the opinions of Justices Burgess and Reiber or they would not have included the language in the dissent.   Basic rights apply to everyone or no one.  If a litigant needs to pass a court-imposed character test to qualify for these rights, they aren’t worth the paper they’re written on. 

Most of Rutland’s violence problems have been attributed to criminals from New York and Massachusetts, and former mayor Jeff Wennberg already discovered a successful formula to run them out of town. There are already tough penalties for shooting someone.  So what will Sen. Mullin’s bill, already approved 5-0 by the Senate Judiciary Committee, accomplish?  Absolutely nothing, unless one counts pandering to his constituents.